establish epistemic foundations for rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR), where rationality includes admissibility, using lexicographic type structures. Their negative result that RCAR is empty whenever the type structure is complete and continuous suggests that iterated admissibility (IA) requires players to have prior knowledge about each other, and therefore is a strong solution concept, not at the same level as iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (IEDS). We follow an alternative approach using standard type structures and show that IA can be generated in a complete and continuous type structure. A strategy is event-rational if it is a best response to a conjecture, as usual, and in addition it passes a "tie-breaking" test based on a set E of strategies of the other player.
Introduction
As noted by Samuelson (1992) and many others, there is an intrinsic impossibility in dealing with common knowledge of admissibility in games, known as the inclusion-exclusion problem. Because a strategy is admissible if and only if it is a best response to a conjecture with full support, whenever knowledge is captured by the support of the conjecture of the player, a player that plays an admissible strategy must necessarily not know much: she must necessarily consider all strategies of the other players as possible, including the strategies that are not admissible. So she cannot know that her opponents play admissible strategies, that is, cannot exclude from consideration the inadmissible strategies of her opponents.
The most appealing approach to dealing with this issue in the literature is Brandenburger et al. (2008) , henceforth BFK. Using lexicographic probability systems (LPS), BFK separate "knowledge" from the support of the conjecture, as follows: the conjecture of a player, say Ann's, is a list (µ 0 , ..., µ n−1 ) of probability distributions over the strategies of the other player, say Bob's. The first conjecture is Ann's primary hypothesis. If Ann is not able to decide between two of her strategies according to µ 0 , she moves on to her secondary hypothesis, µ 1 , and so on. Her overall conjecture will have full support if the union of the supports of µ 0 , ..., µ n−1 is equal to S b , the set of strategies for Bob. And if a set of strategies E b ⊂ S b is assigned probability one by the distributions µ 1 , ..., µ j , and probability zero by the distributions µ j+1 , ..., µ n−1 , then Ann assumes the set E b at level j. Hence, Ann will "know" events E b that are not the entire S b , so BFK are able to proceed and define (and characterize) the situations where admissibility and common assumption of admissibility obtains.
More precisely, BFK work with lexicographic type structures, whereby a type of a player is associated with a lexicographic probability system over the strategies and types of the other player.
A strategy-type pair is rational if the strategy is a best response to the marginal distributions on strategies of the lexicographic system, which has full support. And a type assumes that the other player is rational if the set of strategy-type pairs where the other player is rational is assumed at some level j.
Because BFK consider only lexicographic systems with finite length, that is, the number k above has to be finite, it may be the case that the construction runs into trouble when dealing with countably many rounds of "Ann assumes that Bob assumes that...". In fact, BFK present an impossibility result, that reads as follows: in a complete and continuous type structure, it is impossible to have admissibility and common assumption of admissibility.
The reason seems to be the finiteness requirement. So long as the systems have a "bottom", that is, a primary hypothesis, only finitely many levels of "Ann assumes that Bob assumes..." statements can be handled by BFK's construction. To see this, note that BFK's notion of rationality implies that the supports of the agent's measures form a partition of the state space. Suppose that the set describing m + 1 rounds of mutual belief of rationality is a strict subset of the set describing m rounds. If the agent assumes the latter set at level j, he has to assume the former set at a lower level, thus "losing" some measures. One immediate way out may be to allow for infinitely many measures. BFK mention such an alternative, but do not pursue it, so we do not know whether this route will work. Yang (2009) proposes a weaker notion of "assumption" that handles some measurability issues in BFK, and obtains a possibility result.
We propose an alternative approach, that is complementary to BFK and Yang (2009) , and also obtain a possibility result. By employing standard type structures and standard beliefs we avoid problems such as the violation of the monotonicity property (by assumption and weak assumption) and technicalities arising from the use of lexicographic structures. Moreover, we provide epistemic foundations for both S ∞ W (proposed by Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) ) and IA, using effectively one idea, that of event-rationality. Finally, by modifying only the notion of rationality and not that of beliefs it is easier to compare behavior that results in playing IA with behavior that generates IEDS. This is not the case with LPS because both rationality and beliefs are defined differently, and even the universal state space is not the same.
In particular, instead of working with lexicographic beliefs, we take the following perspective: a strategy that is rational but not admissible is a strategy that loses some "tie-breaking" conditions.
That is, if a strategy for Ann, s a , is rational, it must be a best response to some conjecture, say v ∈ ∆(S b ), where S b is Bob's set of strategies; if s a is not admissible, it cannot be a best response to a conjecture with full support. Hence s a must be strictly worse than some other strategy σ a for some s b outside of the support of v. If we consider as the tie-breaking condition exactly the complement of the support of v, we are able to decide that s a is rational but not admissible, without resorting to a fully supported conjecture. As a consequence, we can capture admissibility in Ann's choices while using the support of Ann's conjecture to reflect what she believes about Bob's choices.
And Ann may well believe that Bob only chooses admissible strategies.
Let E = E a × E b be a set of strategies. We say that s a is E b -rational if s a is a best response to some conjecture of Ann, and Ann uses E b to break ties. In particular, if another strategy σ a gives the same payoff as s a for any of Bob's strategies that are considered possible given Ann's conjecture, then s a must be better under another conjecture with support on the difference between E b and the support of Ann's initial conjecture. Similarly for Bob. In other words, Ann is confident in trusting her belief, just like any other rational agent. But if two of her strategies are equivalent under her belief, she chooses the one that is also optimal for strategies outside her belief but inside the tie-breaking set.
Given E = E a × E b , we can define rationality and common belief of event-rationality in the standard way: Ann is E b -rational and is certain that Bob is E a -rational; Ann is certain that Bob is certain that Ann is E b -rational and that Ann is certain that Bob is E a -rational. And so on.
Since the tie-breaking sets E a and E b need not be the supports of conjectures, we do not run into any inclusion-exclusion problems in the construction. Moreover, we have a degree of flexibility that resembles lexicographic beliefs in that the tie-breaking sets need not be fixed as we move to higher order levels of mutual knowledge. Nor do we have any restriction in choosing the tie-breaking sets to begin with.
Our results are as follows. Using E = S a × S b as the set of all strategies, we characterize the strategies that are compatible with event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER) by a solution concept, hypo-admissible sets (HAS), which is related to the self-admissible sets (SAS) of BFK but it is neither weaker or stronger. In a complete structure, RCBER produces the set of strategies that survive one round of elimination of non admissible strategies followed by iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (S ∞ W ). We then extend the notion of event-rationality by adding tie-breaking sets at each round of belief about belief, and arrive at the strategies that are compatible with common belief of extended event-rationality (RCBeER). We characterize RCBeER with a solution concept we call hypo-iteratively admissible sets (HIA). In a complete type structure, the resulting set of strategies is precisely the set of iterated admissible strategies (IA). We then show that strategies played under RCBeER constitute an SAS, but the converse is not necessarily true, meaning that the RCBeER construction is more restrictive than the RCAR construction of BFK. Nevertheless, we show that the RCBER and the RCBeER are nonempty whenever the type structure is complete, continuous and compact, whereas the RCAR is empty in a complete and continuous (lexicographic) type structure when the agent is not indifferent.
Our approach provides an alternative, effective and simple perspective in dealing with common "knowledge" of admissibility in games. The solution to the inclusion-exclusion problem lies in separating what a player knows from the strategies that she includes in her conjectures. This separation can also be obtained with LPS-based approaches as in BFK, Brandenburger (1992) , Stahl (1995) and Yang (2009) . But LPS-based approaches may add technical elements that are not necessarily relevant for the issue. 1 For instance, BFK's impossibility result suggests that IA is a solution concept that requires that the players are experienced enough with each other so that the type structure used to describe their beliefs is not complete (Brandenburger and Friedenberg (forthcoming) ). In other words, it suggests that IA is to be viewed as a strong solution concept, that is not at the same level as iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) but rather closer to Nash equilibria, whose epistemic conditions require incomplete type structures (see Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) and Barelli (forthcoming) ). But this suggestion is an artifact of the technical details of BFK's LPS-based approach. In fact, RCBeER is more restrictive than RCAR, and it is nonempty in a complete, continuous and compact type structure. Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) provide epistemic foundations for the iteratively undominated strategies via the concept of rationality and common belief in rationality. Admissibility, or the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies, has a long history in decision and game theory (see Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) ). However, Samuelson (1992) shows that common knowledge of admissibility is not equivalent to iterated admissibility. Foundations for the S ∞ W strategies (Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) ) are provided by Börgers (1994) (using approximate common knowl-1 A simple example is that lexicographic type structures typically fail to be compact, whereas the universal type structure, without lexicographic beliefs, is compact. edge), Brandenburger (1992) (using lexicographic probability systems (Blume et al. (1991) ) and 0-level belief) and Ben-Porath (1997) (in extensive form games). Stahl (1995) defines the notion of lexicographic rationalizability and shows that it is equivalent to iterated admissibility.
BFK use lexicographic probability systems and characterize rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR) by the solution concept of self-admissible sets. They show that rationality and m-th order assumption of rationality is characterized by the strategies that survive m+1 rounds of elimination of inadmissible strategies. Finally, RCAR is empty in a complete and continuous lexicographic type structure when the agent is not indifferent. Hence, although the IA set can be captured by RmAR, for big enough m (note that games are finite), BFK do not provide an epistemic criterion for IA. Yang (2009) provides an epistemic criterion for IA, with an analogous version BFK's RCAR, that makes use of a weaker notion of "assumption".
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we illustrate the differences between the various notions of rationality and belief through examples. In sections 3 and 4 we set up the framework and provide the relevant definitions, including event-rationality, RCBER and RCBeER.
In section 5 RCBER is characterized and an epistemic criterion for S ∞ W is provided, whereas in section 6 we characterize RCBeER, provide an epistemic criterion for IA and compare it with the SAS of BFK. In section 7 we show that RCBER and RCBeER are always nonempty in compact, complete and continuous type structures. Finally, some decision theoretic remarks are presented in the Appendix.
Examples
In order to illustrate the differences between the BFK approach and that of the present paper, consider the following game from Samuelson (1992) and BFK. There are two players, Ann and
From Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) we know that rationality and common belief of rationality (RCBR) is characterized by the best response sets (BRS) and, in a complete structure, the strategies that survive iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies. Can we get a similar result for the admissible strategies and the iteratively admissible strategies if we modify the notions of belief and of rationality? Recall that a strategy is admissible if and only if it is a best response to a full support measure (no action of the other player is excluded). Then, the obvious solution is to specify that rationality incorporates full support beliefs.
But such a specification does not always work. In the game above, if Ann is rational, she assigns positive probability to Bob playing L and R. If Bob is rational, he assigns positive probability to
Ann playing U and D. Hence, Bob plays L. If Ann knows that Bob is rational, she assigns positive probability only on Bob playing L. But then, Ann is not rational! In other words, the modified RCBR set is empty for this game.
BFK solve the problem by introducing lexicographic probabilities. 2 Suppose Ann's primary hypothesis assigns probability 1 to Bob playing L, and her secondary hypothesis assigns probability 1 to Bob playing R. Bob's primary hypothesis assigns 1 on U and his secondary hypothesis assigns 1 on D. Then, Bob playing L is rational because he is indifferent between L and R given his primary measure, but strictly prefers L given his secondary measure. 3 Ann playing U is rational because U is the best response given her primary measure. She assumes that Bob is rational, because she considers Bob playing L infinitely more likely than Bob playing R. Similarly, Bob assumes that Ann is rational. As a result, rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR) is nonempty.
A similar result can be obtained if we use the definition of event-rationality in the context of standard type structures. Suppose Ann's belief assigns probability 1 to Bob playing L and Bob's belief µ assigns probability 1 to Ann playing U. Bob playing L is S a -rational because he is playing best response given his beliefs and whenever he is indifferent between L and R, L is better given a conjecture with support S b \ supp µ. Similarly, Ann is S b -rational. Finally, Ann believes that Bob is S a -rational and Bob believes that Ann is S b -rational. Hence, rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER) is nonempty.
In the game above RCAR and RCBER produce the same strategies because the IA and the S ∞ W sets are equal. However, this is not always true. Consider the following game which illustrates the difference between RCBER (which yields the S ∞ W set) and RCBeER (which yields the IA set).
Since D is strongly dominated, no S b -rational type plays that strategy. In a complete structure though, Ann's S b -rational types play U or M and Bob's S a -rational types play L or R. For example, Ann's type is S b -rational if she plays U, while assigning probability 1 to Bob playing L. Ann's type is also S b -rational if she plays M, while assigning probability 1 to Bob playing R. Moreover, for both U and M there are S b -rational types of Ann's who assign positive probability to S a -rational types of Bob playing L or R. And similarly for Bob. In other words, these types of Ann believe the event "Bob is S a -rational", Bob's types believe the event "Ann is S b -rational", and so on for any finite order of beliefs about beliefs. Hence, S a × S b -rationality and common belief of S a × S b -rationality (RCBER) yields the S ∞ W set, {U, M} × {L, R}.
Suppose we require that believing an event E implies that you are E -rational, where E is the set of strategies played by Bob's types who belong to E (and similarly for Bob). 4 Then, imposing common belief of rationality will give us RCBeER. Which strategies are generated by RCBeER?
The first round of RCBeER yields the set of S b -rational types for Ann and S a -rational types for Bob, just like RCBER.
But the second round of RCBeER requires that, in addition to believing the event "Bob is rational", each of Ann's S b -rational types uses the strategies played by Bob's rational types as her tie-breaking set. Then all types playing L are excluded. To see this, note that any S a -rational type playing L must assign probability 1 to Ann playing M. Although Bob's type believes the event "Ann is rational" and Ann's rational types play either U or M, Bob playing L is not {U, M}-rational.
For example, given Bob's beliefs (probability 1 on M) he is indifferent between L and R. Yet, if he compares L and R against U (which is the tie-breaking set {U, M} minus the support of his beliefs, M), L is worse. Once all types playing L are excluded, only types who believe S a -rational types playing R survive in the third round of RCBeER . Hence, playing U is no longer S a -rational for Ann. Finally, RCBeER yields the IA set, which is {M} × {R}.
Set Up
Let (S a , S b , π a , π b ) be a two player finite strategic form game, with π a : S a × S b → R, and similarly for b (as usual, a stands for Ann, and b stands for Bob). For any given topological space X, let ∆(X) denote the space of probability measures defined on the Borel subsets of X, endowed with the weak-* topology. We extend π a to ∆(S a ) × ∆(S b ) in the usual way:
Admissibility and Event-Rationality
The following definition and Lemma are taken from BFK. 
Lexicographic beliefs have been used in dealing with the inclusion-exclusion issue identified by Samuelson (1992 ) (see BFK, Brandenburger (1992 , Stahl (1995) and Yang (2009)). Instead, we will use the following construction. For a given conjecture
such that s a is a best response to v, and for each mixed strategy
The idea is that Ann uses the set E b to break ties: whenever she has a conjecture v ∈ ∆(S b ) over Bob's choices under which s a is an optimal choice and s a is outcome equivalent to a ( We have the following:
In particular, a strategy s a is admissible if and only if it is S b -rational, for the requirement supp v ⊆ S b is trivially met. This will be the case in our analysis in later sections, where we take E b to be equal to S b . Note that we can extend the definition of E b -rationality for several tie-breaking sets:
With this extended definition, the analogy with LPS is tighter: higher order hypotheses are captured by high levels k and the conjectures supported in E b k \ supp v. Note that s a is extended E b -rational for a conjecture v with supp v ⊂ E b k for k = 1, ..., K if and only if it is admissible with respect to S a × E b k for all k = 1, ..., K. Note also that in the extended definition we use collections of nested sets in the power set of E b to break ties, and not only the set E b itself.
In the Appendix we discuss further the notions of event-rationality and extended event-rationality from the perspective of the underlying decision theoretic ideas.
RCBER -Rationality and Common Belief of Event-Rationality
Turn now to higher order levels of "knowledge" of admissibility. We make use of standard type structures, as follows: 
A type structure is complete when λ a and λ b are surjective, and it is continuous when these mappings are continuous. 5 Because the strategy spaces are finite, it is without loss of generality to work with complete and continuous type structures, where in addition T a and T b are compact spaces (Mertens and Zamir (1985) ). Such type structures are called complete, continuous and compact type structures.
Fix an event E ⊆ S b × T b and write
as the set of types that are certain of the event E. Note that this is the standard definition of certainty (as 1-belief), which (unlike assumption, defined below) satisfies monotonicity: if Ann is certain of E and E ⊂ F then Ann is also certain of F .
The LPS-based approach, on the other hand, uses the following construction. Let L + (X) be the space of fully supported LPS over X, that is, the space of finite sequences σ = (µ 0 , ..., µ n−1 ), for some integer n, where µ i ∈ ∆(X) and
In addition, the measures µ i in σ are required to be non-overlapping, that is, mutually singular. A lexicographic type structure is a type structure where
, and similarly for b. An event E is assumed if and only if the closure of the event is equal to the union of the supports of j levels of the player's LPS. That is, there is a level j such that the player assigns probability one to the event E for all of his/her hypothesis up to level j, and assigns probability zero to the event for all of his/her hypothesis of levels higher than j. Yang (2009) uses a weaker notion that allows the levels higher than j to assign positive (and strictly smaller than 1) weights to the event. The use of lexicographic beliefs is to be contrasted with our use of standard beliefs. In the construction that follows we are able to separate certainty of event-rational strategies from certainty of event-rationality.
Let R a 1 be the set of E b -rational strategy-type pairs (s a , t a ). For finite m, define R a m inductively by
Similarly for b, using E a ⊂ S a .
say there is event-rationality and mth-order belief of event-rationality (RmBER) at this state. If
(s a , t a , s b , t b ) ∈ ∞ m=1 R a m × ∞ m=1 R b m say
there is event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER) at this state.
That is, Ann knows that Bob is E a -rational, because she is certain that Bob only chooses strategies that are best responses to Bob's conjectures that Ann considers possible, and that Bob breaks ties using E a . Similarly for Bob. Also, Ann knows that Bob knows that much. And so on.
Note that a strategy-type pair (s a , t a ) in R a m is as follows: s a is a best response to v = marg S b λ a (t a ), and λ a (t a )(R b m−1 ) = 1, and whenever
v ) . Notice that Ann is certain that the conjectures of Bob are of the form
, and knows that, for each such conjecture, Bob breaks ties using some v in E b \ supp v. We show below that this flexibility implies that the set of strategies compatible with RCBER are the ones that survive one round of elimination of inadmissible strategies followed by iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies.
RCBeER -Rationality and Common Belief of Extended Event-Rationality
We now extend the construction to extended Event-Rationality. Fix a type structure and let R a (E) be the set of strategy-type pairs of a who are event-rational. For example, if R a 1 is the set of S brational strategy-type pairs (s a , t a ) we have that
Hence, whenever Ann believes an event E she is also proj S b E-rational, and similarly for Bob, so that she uses proj S b E as an additional tie-breaking set to help deciding among choices, and similarly for Bob. 
Consider
Note that for m = 1 we also have extended event-rationality, with the sequence in S b being the singleton (S b ). Hence we define: This is a generalization of the definition in BFK of the support of a strategy s a , which they denote su(s a ). In particular, su S b (s a ) = su(s a ).
BFK characterize rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR) by the solution concept of a self-admissible set (SAS).
• each s a ∈ Q a is admissible with respect to S a × S b ,
• each s a ∈ Q a is admissible with respect to S a × Q b ,
Likewise for b.
In particular, BFK show that the projection of the RCAR into S a × S b is an SAS. Conversely,
given an SAS Q a × Q b , there is a type structure such that the projection of RCAR into S a × S b is equal to Q a × Q b . BFK discuss the need for the third requirement in the definition of an SAS. In particular, consider the weak best response sets (WBRS), which does not include a restriction on convex combinations.
• each s a ∈ Q a is not strongly dominated with respect to S a × Q b .
Likewise for b.
An "almost" characterization of the WBRS is obtained if, as in Brandenburger (1992) and Börgers (1994) , common assumption of rationality is relaxed to common belief at level 0 of rationality (RCB0R) (that is, knowing E means µ 0 (E) = 1, where µ 0 is the first measure of the agent's LPS). More specifically, on the one hand the projection of RCB0R into S a × S b is a WBRS. On the other hand, given a WBRS Q a × Q b , there is a type structure such that Q a × Q b is contained in (but not necessarily equal to) the projection of RCB0R into S a × S b . 6
We are now ready to introduce the solution concept of hypo-admissible sets (HAS).
• each s a ∈ Q a is admissible with respect to
• s a is admissible with respect to S a × Q 0 ,
• for any s a ∈ Q a , if r a ∈ su Q 0 (s a ) and r a is admissible with respect to S a × S b then r a ∈ Q a .
Note that the first two properties for a WBRS are equivalent to the first two properties for an HAS and they are implied by the first two properties for an SAS. Hence, the SAS and the HAS are always WBRS but the opposite does not hold. Moreover, an SAS is not necessarily an HAS and an HAS is not necessarily an SAS. To see this, consider the following two solution concepts. The first is S ∞ W , the set of strategies that survive one round of deletion of inadmissible strategies followed by iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies (Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) 
The second is the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies, the IA set. 
A strategy s i ∈ S i m is called m-admissible. A strategy s i ∈ ∞ m=0 S i m is called iteratively admissible (IA).
We then have that the S ∞ W set is both an HAS and a WBRS (but not an SAS) and the IA set 
Generalized Self-Admissible and Hypo-Iteratively Admissible Sets
In Section 5 we show that HAS characterizes RCBER with E = S. With a view to obtain a characterization of RCBeER and to relate it to the concepts presented above, we introduce the following two concepts:
• for any s a ∈ Q a , if r a ∈ su P b (s a ) and r a is admissible with respect to S a × S b , then r a ∈ Q a .
Likewise for b.
The only difference from an SAS is that the support su P b (s a ) is with respect to an abstract
then an SAS Q a ×Q b is also an SAS P a ×P b , but the reverse may not hold. This means that for any 
Definition 15. A set Q a × Q b is a hypo-iteratively admissible (HIA) set if there exist sequences of sets {W
a i } ∞ i=0 , {W b i } ∞ i=0 , with W a 0 = S a , W b 0 = S b , such that for each m ≥ 0, • each s a ∈ W a
Likewise for b.
The HIA sets resemble the IA set, with the only difference that one starts with a subset of admissible strategies and always includes the strategies that are equivalent (in the sense of su Q ) to strategies that survive subsequent rounds. Moreover, the HIA can be thought of as an analogue of the best response set (BRS). 
is empty, then the conditions for HAS are satisfied, so suppose that it is nonempty and fix
We have that s a is admissible with respect to Q 0 = supp v, which is a subset of 
That is, the strategies consistent with RCBER are the hypo-admissible strategies according to the definition of an HAS. In a complete structure, these strategies constitute the S ∞ W set as we now verify. 
Proof. It is important to stress that Brandenburger (1992) , Börgers (1994) and Ben-Porath (1997) have obtained the S ∞ W strategies using effectively the notion of RCB0R, which implies but is not implied by the WBRS. HAS is a stronger solution concept than WBRS and yet produces the same strategies in a complete type structure.
Characterization of RCBeER
The following two Propositions show that RCBeER is characterized by the HIA and generates the IA set in a complete type structure.
Proposition 3. 
m implies that r a is admissible with respect to each proj 
Proof. For m = 1, Lemma 2 and a complete structure imply proj S a R Proposition 5.
m is empty, then the conditions for SAS A a ×A b are satisfied, so suppose that it is nonempty. Because R
From Lemma 2 we then have that s a is admissible with respect to S a × Q b .
Suppose s a ∈ Q a , r a ∈ su A b (s a ) and r a is admissible. This implies that for any t a , ( 
In words, for a given type structure, the strategies compatible with RCBeER form a subclass of We now argue that {U}×{L, C} cannot be the outcome of RCBeER. First, note that if this were the case, the types of Ann included in RCBeER should assign zero probability to Bob playing R.
Note also that U is a best response only when P r(L) = As we mentioned above, extended event-rationality makes the analogy with LPS tighter (than event-rationality) in that it includes "higher order hypotheses", in the form of the several tiebreaking sets used. There are, however, substantial differences between the RCBeER construction and the LPS-based RCAR construction. In RCAR the hypotheses are non overlapping, and the level j(m) that the particular set of strategy-type pairs is assumed at round m in the RCAR construction is nonincreasing, which means that the number of hypotheses in RCAR is nonincreasing in the construction. For the RCBeER, the "hypotheses" are necessarily nested and at each new level of the construction one new "hypothesis" is considered. This new "hypothesis" can be understood as the new primary hypothesis, so the number of hypotheses not only increases in the construction, it increases in the particular way of adding a new "bottom" to the list of hypotheses. The reason why RCBeER is more restrictive than RCAR is precisely the use of nested hypotheses. On the other hand, as the primary hypothesis keeps changing along the RCBeER construction, we never encounter the problem found in BFK of reaching the bottom, that is, of running out of hypotheses.
As a result we have the possibility results presented next.
Possibility Results for RCBER and RCBeER
Propositions 2 and 4 suggest that RCBER and RCBeER are nonempty when the tie-breaking set E is equal to S. Below is a direct proof that RCBER and RCBeER are nonempty, whatever the tie-breaking sets, whenever the type structure is complete, continuous and compact (and recall that the universal type structure (Mertens and Zamir (1985) ) satisfies these properties). 
1 is also compact: for any sequence (s a n , t a n ) in R a 1 , we have s a n ∈ BR(v a n ), where v a n = marg S b λ a (t a n ) and BR denotes best response. If (s a n , t a
Further, since S b is finite, we can choose a subsequence such that supp v a n = supp v a m and a fortiori supp v a n = supp v a . Hence, whenever σ a ∼ supp v a s a , we have σ a ∼ supp v a n s a , and hence the existence of a v in E b \supp v a such that
, and pick a convergent sequence (s a n , t a n ) therein, with limit (s a , t a ). Because R b 1 is closed and λ a is continuous, we have lim sup t a n →t a λ a (t a n )(
Also, E b -rationality follows from the same argument above, and we conclude that R a 2 is compact. Inductively, R a m is compact for all m. It follows that Now pick a sequence (s a n , t a n ) in R a m converging to (s a , t a ) and repeat the argument above to conclude that λ a (T a )(R b m−1 ) = 1, and that supp v a n = supp v a , where v a n = marg S b λ a (t a n ) and 
Conclusion
We showed that event-rationality and extended event-rationality can be used to analyze common belief of admissibility in games. In particular, an epistemic criterion for IA can be obtained and it places IA at the same level as IEDS as a solution concept. IA does require that players know more about each other than IEDS does (i.e. admissibility instead of plain rationality), but it certainly does not require that players know each other's conjectures. The fact that each player can perform the IA procedure on her own by considering that the other players only play admissible strategies, much as each player can perform the IEDS procedure on her own (by considering that the other players only play rational strategies), suggests that the epistemic requirements for IA ought not be much more restrictive than those for IEDS, as we indeed show using RCBeER.
Also, because we adopt a perspective different from LPS-based approaches, our analysis is a straightforward extension of the standard analysis of common knowledge of rationality. That is, by noting that admissibility can be captured by breaking ties outside of one's conjectures, we are able to separate beliefs from conjectures and work with standard type spaces. LPS-based approaches,
on the other hand, analyze admissibility from the perspective of fully supported conjectures, and separate beliefs from conjectures by means of lexicographic type spaces.
A Appendix
In terms of the underlying decision theoretic ideas, let us present a model of preferences that captures the ideas of event-rationality. 9 Let Ω be a finite set of states, C a finite set of consequences and F = {x : Ω → ∆(C)} be the set of acts that a decision maker faces. Let x ω denote the value of the act x at the state ω ∈ Ω, and for each A ⊂ Ω let x A denote the tuple (x ω ) ω∈A . A preference relation is a binary relation defined on F. Let AA denote the set of preference relations on F satisfying the axioms in Anscombe and Aumann (1963) . For a given preference relation defined on F, let A denote conditional preference given A ⊂ Ω, that is, x A y if there exists z ∈ F such that (x A , z Ω\A ) (y A , z Ω\A ). Let N ( ) be the set of Savage-null events in Ω according to , that 9 Because we work with standard type structures, belief is the standard notion captured by events that are not Savage-null -see definitions below. What we establish now is the properties that a preference relation ought to satisfy for it to give rise to event-rational behavior. BFK (Yang (2009) ) present axiomatizations of their notion of assumption (weak assumption), whereas the axiomatization of lexicographic beliefs can be found in Blume et al. (1991) . The idea of double checking is that the decision maker uses to guide her choices of x over y, but whenever x = y on the non Savage-null states according to she double checks with preference relations˙ whose Savage-null states include the states that are not Savage-null according to .
The resulting preference relation is denoted by .
A subjective expected utility is a pair (u, p) where u : ∆(C) → R and p ∈ ∆(Ω) such that the expected utility of act x is given by E p u(x) = ω∈Ω u(x ω )p(ω). Given a subjective expected utility (u, p) and a set E ⊂ Ω, we say that x is event-rational relative to y if E p u(x) ≥ E p u(y) and if represented by (u, v) , so that it is in C( ) and we are done.
We say that an act x is event-rational if it is event-rational relative to y for every act y. In the context of normal form games, a strategy s a can be viewed as an act with state space S b , and it is straightforward to verify that a strategy s a is E b -rational according to Definition 2 if and only if it is E b -rational as an act. For a given subjective expected utility (u, p) and a collection of sets (E 1 , ..., E K ) with E = E 1 ⊃ E 2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ E K with, we say that x is extended event-rational relative to y if E p u(x) ≥ E p u(y)
and if x ω = y ω for all ω ∈ supp p then there exist, for each k − 1, ..., K, v k ∈ ∆(Ω) with supp 
